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1
An important subject for the literature on industrial organisation is the determinants of market
competition. In this framework the analysis of multimarket competition considers potential collusion
between different firms that sell products in the same markets. Many studies have tested the
hypothesis that multimarket linkages between companies could lead to stronger collusion. Firms that
are present in many markets at once might co-operate instead of competing aggressively.
The application of the  multimarket contact hypothesis to the banking industry is
straightforward. Banks are firms offering relatively homogeneous goods in several geographic
markets. In the past the highly regulated nature of the banking industry could be a limit to industrial
organisation  applications; this constraint has diminished  since  deregulation  and market
developments began changing banking in many countries. For instance, in the USA the current
merger movement has made the banking industry a laboratory for analysing competition, strategic
behaviour, the survival of economic barriers to entry, and the effects of concentration on efficiency
and prices
2.
In Italy, the liberalisation of branching since 1990 has led to a great increase in the number of
branches, more extensive contacts between banks and lesser concentration of local markets,
despite the unprecedented increase in mergers. The present paper tests the hypothesis that more
contacts between banks may have led to a sort of mutual forbearance against the counter-thesis
that increased contacts may have worked to promote competition and to the advantage of banks’
customers.  The subject has  both  theoretical  and  practical relevance for assessing the policy
implications of the evolution of the banking industry.  A pro-competitive relationship between
                    
1 We are grateful for helpful comments from Paolo  Angelini, Michele  Grillo,  Matteo Piazza,
Michele Polo, Massimo  Roccas,  Giancarlo  Spagnolo,  Pierluigi  Sabbatini,  Daniele  Terlizzese and
participants in two Ente Einaudi seminars in Rome. One anonymous referee provided useful insights
which helped to improve the paper. Any remaining errors are our own. We thank  Piero De
Franceschis, Edy Lucci and Edoardo Tagliaferri for editing and research assistance; the latter is the
author of Appendix II. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not
necessarly reflect those of the Banca d’Italia or the European Commission.
2 See Rhoades (1997) for a synthesis.8
multimarket contacts and performance is the natural a ssumption  of banking  practitioners and
regulators.
The paper is divided into six sections. After this introductory section, the second one surveys
past studies on the multimarket contact hypothesis, with a particular focus on banking. The third
section summarises the main changes in the Italian banking industry in the nineties. Section 4
describes measures of multimarket links and other variables that have been selected with reference
to a sample of dominant Italian banks; for each of these intermediaries we present measures of
multimarket contacts both inside and outside the relevant market for loans, which has been
identified with the province. The fifth section presents some econometric results on the effect of
banking linkages on loan market shares and lending rates. The sixth and final section briefly sets out
our conclusions.
2. A survey of the literature on the multimarket contact hypothesis
Edwards (1955) was the first author to claim that stronger multimarket links may induce
greater collusion between firms acting in non-competitive markets. In his view:
When one large conglomerate enterprise competes with another, the two are likely to
encounter each other in a considerable number of markets. The multiplicity of their contacts
may blunt the edge of their competition. A prospect of advantage from vigorous competition
in one market may be weighted against the danger of retaliatory forays by the competitor in
other markets. Each conglomerate may develop a live-and-let-live policy designed to
stabilise the whole structure of the competitive relationship.
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) provided the first formal theoretical analysis of multimarket
contact and tacit collusion, emphasising the effects of the degree of external contact and internal
market characteristics on firms’ prices. The existence of contacts may imply that firms not only
increase their power to collude but may also find it profitable to design strategic policies and
redistribute market power among markets where they are operating. Essential to Bernheim and
Whinston’s result that multimarket meetings can facilitate collusion are the complete-information and
the infinite horizon hypotheses: collusion is sustained by the threat of causing a punishment strategy9
infinitely in the future. Mester (1992) presents a model in which firms compete in multiple periods.
The model may also be interpreted by viewing firms as making sequential decisions in various
markets. Assuming imperfect information, the article shows that multiple contacts may have a pro-
competitive effect if quantity is the strategic variable, even if firms have a finite horizon. Tirole
(1988) presents an example of how collusion changes according to multimarket or single-market
contacts between firms. Following  Bernheim and  Whinston,  Spagnolo (1999) shows that
multimarket contact always facilitates collusion.
With regard to the empirical literature, Feinberg (1985), looking at company and industry
data, obtained results which cast some doubt on the multimarket contact hypothesis. Scott (1982)
showed that firms’ profits are higher when both concentration and contacts, not just multimarket
links, are greater. Scott (1991) integrated the multimarket contact hypothesis in the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm, showing that multimarket linkages are essential to prove the nexus
between barriers to entry, concentration and profits. Witteloostuijn and Wegberg (1992) presented
the multimarket perspective as a way to integrate the literature on industrial organisation and
strategic management.
Looking at a database for UK manufacturing industry in 1979, Hughes and Oughton (1992)
find that multimarket contacts have a positive effect on profitability as measured by the price-cost
margin or the rate of return. Evans and  Kessides (1994) claimed that previous studies on
multimarket links produced twofold results because they did not control for market-specific factors.
They try to capture the heterogeneity of firms using a panel approach and conclude that in the U.S.
airline industry competitors refrain from aggressive pricing actions for fear of retaliation from other
firms. Kim and Singal (1993) study price changes associated with airline mergers in the second half
of the eighties in the USA. One of their findings is that airlines may compete less vigorously in one
market due to the fear of retaliation in another. Therefore “ market power derived from
multimarket contact deserves attention from the regulators”. Analysing the US cellular
telephone industry, Parker and Roller (1997) find that multimarket contacts are an important factor
in explaining non-competitive prices. Using data from the Spanish hotel industry, Fernandez and
Marin (1998) support the prediction of  Bernheim and  Whinston that  multimarket contact10
contributes to a reduction in rivalry among firms; the authors also find that the omission of variables
measuring multimarket contact creates a downward bias on the effect of concentration on prices.
As far as banking is concerned, Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) presented a first paper on
multimarket interdependence in US banking. Using changes in deposit market shares as proxy for
rivalry between firms and alternative measures of multimarket linkages, the authors conclude that
more contacts between banks yield less competitive behaviour. Heggestad and Rhoades (1985)
modified their earlier study using profits and prices as measures of banking market rivalry: only
partial support was found for the mutual forbearance hypothesis. Mester (1987), with reference to
the saving and loan institutions operating in California, reached the conclusion that banking contacts
have a pro-competitive effect; this is in line with the theoretical model of Mester (1992). It is the
cross product between market concentration and contact that is important rather than the individual
effects: high concentration coupled with high contact is found to be beneficial to consumers.
Examining the banking deposit markets in the USA, Whalem (1996) found weak evidence for the
multimarket contact hypothesis. Using profitability as measure of competition, Piloff (1999) finds
that contact is positively and meaningfully related to profitability for a small group of American
banks most heavily exposed to outside contact. Building a model which separates two different
sources of market power – collusion in the industry versus location in markets - Barros (1999)
rejects market collusion in an application to Portuguese commercial banking; collusion within the
same economic group of banks, however, cannot be completely ruled out.
Given the ambiguous evidence reached, especially in the banking field, by the previous
studies inspired by the multimarket contact hypothesis, there is room for further analysis. Past
research has been mainly focused on American firms, while applications to European markets have
been rarer.
3. The evolution of the Italian banking industry in the nineties
This section summarises the main structural trends of the Italian  banking industry, paying
particular attention to measures of banking overlapping and competition.11
The evolution of the Italian banking system is similar to the recent experience of the American
banks, although restructuring is far from complete. In the USA a wave of banking mergers started
in the e ighties and accelerated in the nineties, accompanied by the abolition of geographic
constraints on branching implied by the Riegel-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994
3. In Italy banking mergers and acquisitions peaked in the nineties, contributing to a
strong drop in the number of banks (Fig. 1); moreover, the intense growth of new branches after
the liberalisation in the nineties interrupted more than fifty years of severe barriers to entry in
banking markets.
During the nineties the Italian banking system was characterised by a higher degree of
geographic overlap than in the past. In 1980, the average number of banks in each province was 21
(Table 1). At the end of 1996 the number had increased to 29, in spite of the decrease in the
number of banks at the macro-level and the increase in the number of provinces. Provinces in the
North have more banks than other areas, although the number of banks per province has increased
everywhere. The growth has been slower in Sicily and Sardinia.
The Italian banking system has historically been characterised by the prevalence of local
banks. Few credit institutions are active throughout the country. However, the number of banks per
province has considerably increased since 1980 (Table 2). In 1996, nine banks had branches in
more than 40 provinces, while 32 banks were present in less than 40 and more than 10 provinces.
The remaining credit institutions, around 900 intermediaries, had branches in less than 10 provinces
(the last two classes of Table 2).
Out of 8,000 Italian municipalities, 5,071 had at least one bank in 1996 (4,088 in 1980;
Table 3). The number of banks was greater in 1996 than in the eighties in all municipalities
4; this
was especially true for those that already had the largest number of banks (more than 11) in 1980.
The distribution of municipalities by number of branches had also seen an increase in all the
classes, chiefly in the number of cities with the largest number of branches (Table 4). Table 5 shows
                    
3 On American bank mergers and geographic liberalisation see Amel and Rhoades (1989), Moore
(1995), Antitrust Bullettin (1996).
4 This is also true for municipalities with one bank: Table 3 does not consider branches of small
cooperative banks.12
that provinces with a small number of branches (up to 100) have decreased, while provinces with a
large number of branches (more than 100) have increased.
Branch increases in municipalities (Table 4) and provinces (Table 5) might be an ambiguous
indicator of stronger competition: because of the great number of mergers in the nineties, a few
larger banks might be responsible for the intense growth  of branches both in municipalities and
provinces. Up to the end of the eighties, the annual number of mergers was around 12. This rose to
an average of 43 per year in the nineties (Table 6). Notwithstanding the considerable increase in
mergers, local market concentration has fallen because of branch openings. Concentration of local
markets of loans decreases from 1990 to 1994, increases in 1995 due to the consolidation of the
special credit institutions by the public-sector parent banks
5, and falls again in 1996 and 1997. The
Herfindahl index of local deposit markets decreases monotonically between 1990 and 1997.
Overall, mergers have not influenced the trend towards lower banking concentration. Mergers have
resulted in greater geographic overlap of Italian banks, reinforcing intermediaries’ multiple contacts
in geographic markets caused by the liberalisation of branching.
We now turn to the analysis of how multimarket presence influences measures of banking
competition.
4. Sample characteristics and measures of multimarket links
In multimarket contact studies, the analysis must regard large banks only, as they encounter
each other in several markets and have sufficient market power to influence competitors’ behaviour.
For instance, for the USA Whalem (1996) focuses on banks that are dominant at the state level
(top three banks in terms of state deposits).
The analysis of this paper focuses on the top 55 Italian banks. All the variables are measured
at the provincial level. For each province the first 15 banks of the macro-area to which the province
belongs are considered. The leading 15 cover more than 70 per cent of the loan market in each
                    
5 This effect mainly reflects a statistical discontinuity that took place in 1995: consolidation of the
special credit institutions occurred between 1990 and 1992 but new statistical returns were produced
starting in January 1995.13
macro-area. We choose to study the market for loans because it is characterised by potentially
larger mobility than the deposit market.
In economic theory collusive behaviour between firms may be evaluated by looking, inter
alia, at market shares and prices (on the latter point see section 5.2). With regard to market shares
Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) claim that “stability of dominant firms’ market shares may be
taken as an indirect measure of the degree of rivalry in a market. The greater is their
stability over time, the less likely is the market to be competitive”. A possible critique of this
approach is that a football game may finish with neither side winning (a draw) but this does not
imply that the two teams colluded. We maintain however the idea that stability of market shares – in
football terms, the persistence of draws over time – is a signal of low competition.
Other studies of  multimarket interdependence have used profits or profit variations as
measures of competition among firms (see, e.g., Pilloff, 1999). We do not follow this road because
profits may be a spurious measure of competition in banking. Changes in profits may derive from
interest rate volatility, the conduct of monetary policy, balance sheet policy (e.g. for write-downs
and write-offs of loans); these factors influence profits but may be unrelated to the competitive
struggle. In the nineties, banking profitability decreased in Italy, but the diminution derived not only
from the increase in competition, as reflected by the narrowing of banking margins, but also by the
increase in loan riskiness and the persistence of high internal costs. Moreover, data on profits are
not available on a local basis but only for the entire bank, whereas the use of information on local
markets can provide useful insights on strategic interactions among intermediaries.
Rivalry between banks, measured through positive or negative changes in market shares
(DQM), may depend, among other factors, on market concentration, loan growth, contacts
between dominant banks and banking costs:
(1)  DQMipt = f(HERpt, DLOANpt, Lipt, COFit)
where i= bank, p= province, t= time.
DQMipt is given by the absolute value of the percentage change in each bank’s provincial
market share. The degree of market concentration is measured by the Herfindahl index (HERpt),14
which is equal to the sum of the squared market shares and varies between zero and one. Our goal
is to estimate the impact of concentration on changes in market shares. Previous studies have
sometimes found a negative impact of concentration on variations in market shares. DLOANpt
shows the growth rate of loans in each province: a more dynamic loan tendency might increase
intermediaries’ competitive attitude.  COFit indicates the ratio between banks’ costs and total
assets: we look at the impact of banks’ efficiency on their aggressive behaviour, as measured by
modifications in market shares. Table 7a reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables
and the regressors.
The question of what the relevant market is in the banking industry is far from being settled
6.
In this paper we use the province as an approximation. From 1990 to 1996 in Italian antitrust cases
on bank mergers the province has been the market most often investigated. A large set of bank
data are also available at the provincial level. Therefore, our first measure of multimarket overlap
counts contacts in each province.
Lipt is an index measuring the extent of provincial multimarket contacts among the 15 most
important banks in each macro-area
7. We built a “contact matrix” that measures how many times a
bank meets another bank in a province by looking at common locations in each municipality
8.
Consider the case of 3 banks (A, B, C) that are active in a province. Bank A meets bank B two
times and bank C four times, while bank B meets bank C one time (in other words banks A and B
both have branches in two towns and so on). The “contact matrix” is then:
                    
6 See Kwast, Starr-Mccluer and Wolken (1997) and Radecki (1998).
7 Heggestad and Rhoades (1978) built a similar variable with regard to 187 American metropolitan
areas.
8 The index L considers the contemporaneous presence of banks in each municipality, without
measuring the intensity of banks’ contacts. In other words there is one contact both if two banks have
one branch in a town or if the first bank has two branches and the second bank ten branches.15
BANKS A B C
A - 2 4
B 2 - 1
C 4 1 -
In this example Lipt is 3 (6/2) for bank A: on average bank A has three contacts in the
province (six contacts with two banks). We normalise a bank’s value of contacts in a province with
the number of the other intermediaries among the 15 dominant banks of the macro-area which are
present in the province. The province’s average number of contacts (Lpt) is 2.3 (7/3): there are
seven contacts between three banks in the area. The “contact matrix” and the indexes Lipt and Lpt
are described in detail in Appendix I.
The annual level of contacts (Lipt) and their change (DLipt) are used as regressors. The
expected signs for the variables Lipt and DLipt are negative if the hypothesis of mutual forbearance is
valid: higher linkages among banks cause less competitive behaviour. Conversely, a positive sign for
the coefficient implies that more frequent contacts result in more intense competition.
Table 7b shows the trend of the average number of contacts between banks (Lpt) and the
total number of branches (of all existing Italian banks) in each province, which is another measure of
the growing overlap of Italian banks; the latter variable has also been used as an indicator of
banking contacts (see par. 5.1). On average, one of the 15 dominant banks met another large
intermediary more than 2.4 times in each province in 1996 (1.7 in 1990). At the macro-area level
the highest linkages among the dominant banks are found in the North-West, the lowest in the
Centre. In all the areas, contacts between banks increased in the nineties, notwithstanding the fact
that mergers may have caused a decrease in banking meetings. The degree of this reduction
depends on the geographic overlap between the merged banks
9.
Looking at banks with a multimarket presence, the five Italian macro-regions have different
banking markets. In the North-West the chief banks are former local intermediaries which are
                    
9 If this is high, the number of linkages will be strongly affected. At the limit, when there is no
overlap, the merger does not change the “contact matrix” because the resulting bank will substitute
the old banks in every town.16
today among the leading Italian banks (Table 8; the most important merged banks are also
reported). In the North-East, the market is ruled by regional banks which do not have a strong
presence throughout Italy. The Centre resembles the  North-West, with a prevalence of large
national banks. In the South, the top banks in the ranking are mainly intermediaries from other
regions. The Islands have a situation similar to that in North-East, with a prevalence of regional
banks.
We also built a different measure of contact by counting, for each bank and each province,
the number of contacts between the approximately 15 multimarket banks outside the given province
(COItaly; contacts are measured on a municipal basis). The intuition for this variable is that each
bank’s behavior in the relevant market (i.e. the province) might be influenced by the threat of rivals’
retaliation in other markets all over Italy
10. The variable COItaly has been weighted with the number
of multimarket banks which meet inside the given province. Table 9 reports descriptive statistics for
COItaly and its variants.
5. Econometric results
5.1 Effects of multimarket links on changes in market shares
The estimated equation - see expression (1) - is as follows:
(2) DQMipt = Xipt b + Zpt g + mi + lt + eipt
where Xipt are individual regressors (like multimarket links with other banks or the ratio of costs to
total assets); Zpt refers to independent variables measured on a provincial base (like the Herfindahl
index or loan growth); mi measures individual effects; lt shows time dummies; eipt are the residuals.
                    
10 See Pilloff (1999) for a discussion of the different classes of linkages which have been used in
the banking literature on multimarket contacts.17
The dependent variable is the absolute value of the annual percentage change in market
share. Both positive and negative changes are indicators of market rivalry. Therefore, we take such
variations in absolute value.
Table 10 shows the regression that was conducted with reference to Italy as a whole. The
panel regression refers to 6,935 observations for the years 1990-96 (see Appendix II for further
details on the data). The choice between the fixed effects or the random effects model is
determined on the basis of the Hausman test
11.
The increase in the geographic overlap of banks (DLi) has a positive and significant effect on
the change in market shares: the larger the increase in multimarket linkages, the greater the change
in individual market shares (Table 10, column (i)). We also find a positive influence of banks’
overlapping on market shares’ changes using the level of contacts Li as regressor (column (ii)).
The Herfindahl index (HER) has a positive effect on the changes in market shares (Table 10,
column (iii)). The result is not in line with previous multimarket studies, in which concentration
indexes are more frequently negatively correlated with modifications of market shares. In Italy,
competition also seems to be strong in provinces where oligopolists are prevalent; the positive
effect of HER on market share changes may also depend on the new entry of large banks in
provinces where local intermediaries have considerable market power. Finally, the Herfindahl index
may also be considered as a control variable that accounts for the effect of mergers on variations in
market shares
12.
Loan growth (DLOAN) has a significant influence on market share variations (column (iv)).
We may infer that a larger credit variation impacts positively on competition.
In Table 11 we perform some robustness checks of the validity of our indicator of
multimarket links (DLi) and the other regressors. First, the significance of the overlapping indicator
(DLI) has been tested adding another proxy for provincial contacts between intermediaries: the
                    
11 The fixed effects model assumes that the individual effects are correlated with the independent
variables. The random effects model assumes that such correlation is absent. The Hausman test is
distributed as a c
2 and tests the null hypothesis of no correlation between the individual effects and
the regressors. See Greene (1993), chapter 16.
12 A measure of banks’ wealth (the ratio between own funds and total assets) does not influence
individual market shares (therefore the variable is not reported in Table 10).18
number of branches in each province of the top 230 banks. An increase (DBRANCHES) in the
number of branches in each province negatively influences changes in leading banks’ market shares
(Table 11; however the value of the coefficient is small). The significance of the variable measuring
multimarket linkages (DLi) is confirmed. The negative sign of DBRANCHES might imply that large
banks’ market shares are more stable where minor banks open more branches.
Second, the weight of operating costs on assets (COSTS/ASSETS) has a negative and
significant effect on the change in market shares (Table 11, first four columns). This result
corresponds to the idea that the less efficient firms are not able to gain market shares but, also, do
not apparently loose market power.
Third, we look at the interaction between the number of contacts and market concentration,
building a new variable, HECO, given by their product (Table 11, column v). According to some
authors in the multimarket literature, it is the product between market concentration and contacts
that is important rather than the individual effects of the two variables (on this interaction see Scott
(1982) and Mester (1987)). We also find that the product between contacts and the Herfinahl
index on a provincial basis, the variable HECO, positively influences market share changes (column
(v)).
As explained in section 4, banks’ attitude in the relevant market (i.e. the province) might be
influenced by the threat of retaliation in other markets. In Table 12, we look at the effect on market
shares of the other indicators of multimarket links (COItaly and its variants). Table 12 reports a
regression (columns (i)) in which the dependent variable is always the annual percentage change in
the market share of each bank in each province, but the independent variable is the number of
contacts between banks outside the relevant markets. Contacts between multimarket banks all over
Italy have a positive but not significant effect on market share changes. The same non-significant
results are obtained using a normalised measure of contacts (column (ii)) or the annual change in
contacts as regressors (column (iii)). The fit of the regressions is also poor
13. The non-significance
of coefficients may depend on the fact that among the multimarket banks there is still a prevalence
of regional or provincial intermediaries, whose activity is concentrated only in restricted areas of
                    
13 Results obtained with the fixed effects model are similar.19
Italy (see Table 8). In other words, “outside the province” contacts do not influence “inside the
province” competitive behavior.
Overall, the previous results do not support the idea that multimarket competition implies
more stability in market shares.
5.2 Effects of multimarket links on lending rates
Multimarket contacts between banks may also influence lending rates. De  Bonis and
Ferrando (1997a and 1997b) found that interest rates are positively influenced by credit market
concentration, loan riskiness, and banks’ costs. In this section we concentrate on the possible effect
of multimarket contacts on lending rates. Table 13 reports an econometric exercise in which banks’
average lending rates in each province ( ILipt) are regressed on  multimarket links between
intermediaries (Li), loan growth (DLOANp) and riskiness of banks’ loan portfolio (BAD/TOTAL
LOANSip). The estimated equation is as follows:
(3) (ILipt)= f (Li, DLOANp, BAD/TOTAL LOANSip).
The estimates refer to the period 1990-94. Multimarket linkages have a negative and significant
effect on lending rates. Increased contacts between banks cause lower lending rates. This is
consistent with the effect that multimarket meetings have on loan quantities. The growth rate of
loans in each province is negatively correlated with interest rates. This might imply that a larger
supply of credit corresponds to lower rates. Finally, as expected the ratio between bad and total
loans has a positive and significant effect on interest rates. Regressions on the different macro-
regions confirm the negative effect of multimarket links on lending rates in the North-West and the
South (the results are not reported). The effect is also negative but not significant for the other
regions.20
6. Conclusions
The multimarket contact hypothesis holds that more contacts between firms competing in the
same markets may induce more collusion. This paper tests the hypothesis for the Italian banking
market, analysing the behaviour of the 55 largest Italian banks from 1990 to 1996; these
intermediaries have an extensive presence in all five macro-regions. Market rivalry is gauged by
changes in loan market shares and interest rates in each Italian province. There has been a
considerable increase in branches and multimarket contacts in recent years. Different measures of
multimarket linkages are presented, trying to capture the extent of contacts between banks inside
the provinces and throughout Italy. We estimate the effects of increasing  multimarket links,
concentration indicators, banks’ costs and loan growth on variations in market shares and interest
rates. No support is found for the multimarket contact hypothesis. Geographical overlap in banking
is positively correlated with changes in market shares, confirming the thesis of an overall increase in
competition within the Italian banking system. Greater multimarket links also seem to correspond to
lower lending rates. Our interpretation is that forms of collusion between banks are less likely when
barriers to entry are lowered, as was the case with Italian branch liberalization in the nineties.
These results will have to be confirmed by looking at other measures of banking rivalry and
geographic overlap. The bank deposit market is the  natural candidate for a new test of the
multimarket contact hypothesis. The analysis of the deposit market might consider not only the
effect on competition of traditional branch expansion but also the influence of alternative networks
such as ATMs. Competition between local managers in each territory might also be captured by
market shares and number of banks/branches in each municipal market, without aggregating the
figures on a provincial basis. Multimarket meetings could be studied with reference to the different
institutional categories of Italian banks:  cooperative banks, former savings banks, and other
commercial banks established as joint stock companies. As far as the definition of  multimarket
banks is concerned, only the small group of large national Italian intermediaries that are present in
all the provinces (around ten banks) might be selected. Instead of devoting attention to the single
bank as a monad, the analysis might consider how  cross-holdings between banks and banking
groups influence aggressive behaviour and interest rates.21
Finally, it is worthwhile to wonder, as a caveat to our analysis, if greater competition might
lead to a more extensive widespread presence and therefore to increased contacts. We also leave
this subject, which states a nexus opposite to that implicit in the multimarket contact hypothesis, for
further research.Appendix I
 The variables Li and Lp
The multimarket variable Lipt summarises the number of contacts between a dominant bank i and
the other largest firms in market p (province) at time t. The variable is constructed as follows. For
each year and each province p, let Dij be a variable that equals one if the bank i operates in the
market j (where j=1,..P is a municipality, i.e. a market smaller than the province), zero otherwise.
First we construct a matrix
A=(ail)
where










       j = 1,..P  municipalities;    i, l = 1......,B banks and  i„l.
The matrix A (BxB) is symmetric and ail measures the number of times that the largest bank i
th
meets the largest bank l
th in the province p, while the diagonal element aii is the number of local
markets in which the bank i is present.
The measure of contacts Li  is then the sum of the off-diagonal terms of row i, divided by the total
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The variable Li  is calculated for each province and each year and is called Lipt. It measures the
average number of contacts that the bank i has with all the other banks in province p at time t.
A variable Lp  has then been calculated with reference to the province. It measures the average
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Lp is the sum of the off-diagonal terms in the upper part of the matrix A divided by the number of
terms.Appendix II
The data and definitions of the variables
The analysis refers to the period 1990-96. The sample of 55 banks has been chosen by selecting
the top 15 short-term banks in terms of loans in the five Italian macro-regions: North-West, North-
East, Centre, South, Islands. Looking at the city of originary location, 14 intermediaries come from
the North-West, 12 from the North-East, 12 from the Centre, 6 from the South, 9 from the
Islands. The panel data are unbalanced; some banks disappear from the sample because they
merged with other intermediaries. All the information is taken from the statistical returns which
banks provide to the Bank of Italy. Data are annual and refer to the end of December.
The monthly sample of Italian banks included 265 banks (232 short-term banks, 33 long-term
banks) at the end of 1996, out of a total population of 937 banks. The sample covered 93 per cent
of deposits and 95 per cent of loans in the banking system.
The lending rates are taken from the Central Credit Register (CCR). The CCR was established to
safeguard banks against the risk of customers’ obtaining multiple loans from different institutions.
The survey of lending rates covers, for the years 1990-94, about 80 large banks accounting for
about 70 per cent of total lending by the banking system (Banca d’Italia, 1994).
List of the variables
1. DQM. The change in the market share of each bank in the sample in every province refers to the
loan market. The denominator considers the loans of the leading short term banks located in each
province (with the exemption of cooperative banks).
2. HER. The Herfindahl index is equal to the sum of the squared market shares in each province.
The first 230 Italian short-term banks are considered.
3. DLOAN. Credit variation is measured by the growth rate of loans in each province. The first
230 Italian short-term banks are considered.
4. Li and Lp. The variables show the number of municipality-level linkages between banks in each
province. The variables have been measured with reference to: a) the average number of contacts in
each province between pairs within the first 15 banks in each macro-region (Li); b) the average
number of contacts (of each bank with the others) in each province (Lp).
5. COItaly. The variable measures municipal contacts across Italy – for each intermediary - among
the 15 most important banks in each province, with the exception of the contacts in the province
whose market share is considered. We weight COItaly by the number of multimarket banks which
have branches in the province (COBP). Finally, annual changes in the weighted variables (DCOBP)
are computed.25
6. BANKS. The variable considers the number of banks in each Italian province. The sample refers
to the first 230 Italian banks.
7. BRANCHES. The variable considers the number of branches in each Italian province. The
sample refers to the first 230 Italian banks.
8. COSTS/ASSETS. The ratio between banks’ operating costs and total assets is calculated for
each bank in the sample.
9. BAD LOANS.  The variable considers the ratio between banks’ bad loans and total loans in
each province for each intermediary.
10. ILipt The data on interest rates comprise the interest calculation figures paid by borrowers
subject to Central Credit Register reporting. Credit reported reflects the most common forms of
customer finance such as discounting of bills, direct lending, and current account overdrafts.Table 1
NUMBER OF BANKS PER PROVINCE
Macro-region 1980 1989 1996
North-West 23 31 32
North-East 28 37 39
Center 19 24 28
South 16 23 23
Sicily and Sardinia 17 19 20
Italy 21 27 29
Note: Simple averages of provincial data. All banks operating in Italy.
Table 2
EXTENT OF BANKS’ BRANCH NETWORKS BY NUMBER OF PROVINCES
Number of provinces 1980 1989 1996
> 40 5 7 9
11 – 40 13 24 32
4 – 10 28 67 73
< 4 1104 987 823
1150 1085 937
Note: All banks operating in Italy.Table 3
DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES BY NUMBER OF BANKS
Municipalities
Banks 1980 1989 1996
1 2407 2506 2328
2 – 5 1543 1625 2251
6 – 10 112 181 327
11 – 15 16 39 99
16 – 20 7 17 37
21 – 30 1 12 20
> 30 2 4 9
Total municipalities with banks 4088 4384 5071
Note: Monthly sample of Italian banks.
Table 4
DISTRIBUTION OF MUNICIPALITIES BY NUMBER OF BRANCHES
Municipalities
Branches 1980 1989 1996
1 2340 2437 2256
2 – 5 1522 1594 2190
6 – 10 136 209 347
11 – 50 78 126 238
51 – 100 5 9 25
101 – 150 3 3 6
> 150 4 6 9
Note: Monthly sample of Italian banks.Table 5
DISTRIBUTION OF PROVINCES BY NUMBER OF BRANCHES
Provinces
Branches 1980 1989 1996
15-50 13 5 5
50-100 32 34 15
100-200 32 30 45
200-300 11 15 15
300-400 3 6 8
400-500 2 2 9
>500 2 3 6
Total provinces 95 95 103
Note: Monthly sample of Italian banks.
Table 6



















Note: All banks operating in Italy.Table 7a
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: CHANGES IN MARKET SHARES, MULTIMARKET
CONTACTS INSIDE PROVINCES (LI) and other regressors (*)
Mean Minimum Maximum
Annual % change in market share 0.0025 -0.25 0.51
Herfindahl index (HER) 0.16 0.03 0.56
Individual bank contacts(Li) 2.13 0.09 21.4
Yearly variation in bank contacts
(Vli)
0.19 -1.75 13.8
Number of contacts at provincial
level (Lp)
2.12 0.61 9.68
Annual rate of growth of loans in
each province (DLOAN)
0.094 -0.46 1.69
Number branches per province 224.8 11 1835
Annual change in branches per
province (DBRANCHES)
14 -3 128
Annual change in banks per
province (DBANKS)
0.36 -6 7
Costs/total assets 0.028 0.01 0.052
(*) See Appendix II for definition of variables.
Table 7b
MULTIMARKET LINKS (VARIABLE LPT) AND AVERAGE NUMBER
OF TOTAL BRANCHES IN THE PROVINCES OF EACH MACRO-AREA
1990 1996
Lpt Branches Lpt Branches
NORTH-WEST 1.86 231 2.77 336
NORTH-EAST 1.49 161 2.11 242
CENTRE 1.54 156 1.84 212
SOUTH 1.35 97 2.17 149
SICILY AND SARDINIA 2.09 100 2.40 136
ITALY 1.65 161 2.37 233
Note: Simple averages of provincial data for branches.Table 8
BANKS WITH A MULTIMARKET PRESENCE
North-West North-East Centre South
S. Paolo To. Rolo banca 1473 S.p.a. Banca di Roma B. Napoli B. Sicilia
Cariplo Popolare Verona BNL BNL B. Sardegna
Comit C.R. Bologna MPS S. Paolo To. Sicilcassa
BNL BNL S. Paolo To. Banca di Roma BNL
Pop. Ber.-Cre. Var. B. Antoniana B. Napoli MPS Comit
Credito Italiano Ambrosiano Ve. Cariplo Comit S. Paolo To.
Banca di Roma Cariverona B. Toscana Credito Italiano MPS
Ambrosiano Vene. Comit Comit Carical Credito Italiano
Pop. Milano C.R. Padova-Rovigo C. R. Firenze Caripuglia Cariplo
C.R. Torino Pop. Emilia-Romag. Credito Italiano Cariplo Banca di Roma
MPS C.R. Parma-Piacen. B. Sicilia BNA B. Napoli
Pop. Novara S. Paolo To. B. delle Marche Banca Mediterranea
Carige Credito Italiano BNA Ambrosiano Ve.
CAB Banca di Roma Pop. Novara Pop. Novara
Cred. Bergamasco Cariplo Pop. Etruria-La. Pop. Irpinia
Merged banks
Banco di Roma S.Geminiano C. Risp. Roma B. del Salento Banco di Roma
Prov. Lombarda Banco di Roma B. S. Spirito B. S. Spirito
Lariano Pop. Veneta Banco di Roma Banco di Roma




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: MULTIMARKET CONTACTS OUTSIDE A GIVEN
PROVINCE (“COITALY”)
Mean Minimum Maximum
Contacts in municipalities between




banks in each province (COBP)
68.9 1.0 543.5
Annual change in COBP 2.4 -169.8 350.3Table 10
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: EFFECTS OF PROVINCIAL  MULTIMARKET
CONTACTS ON THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF CHANGE IN MARKET SHARES
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Fixed effects Random effects Fixed ffects Fixed effects








CONSTANT 0.68 * 0.6 * 0.2 * 0.1
(26.7) (3.1) (3.3) (1.5)
N. observations 6,935 6,935 6,935 6,935
R
2 0.20 0.02 0.21 0.21
Lagrange Mult.
Test
5804 3997 5366 1216
Hausman test 7.3 1.9 8.1 11.1
c
2   test:
Time, individual
Dummies
928 808 872 737
Dependent variable: annual absolute value percentage change in market shares.
Independent variables: change in links between banks (DLI); links between banks (LI); Herfindahl
index (HER); growth rate of loans (DLOAN).
Notes
t - statistics are in brackets.
*     Coefficient significant at 1 per cent.
**   Coefficient significant at 5 per cent.
The LM test is distributed as a c
2  with 2 degrees of freedom.
The Hausman test is distributed as a c
2 .
The c
2  test for time and individual dummies is distributed with 101 degrees of freedom.Table 11
ECONOMETRIC RESULTS: EFFECTS OF PROVINCIAL  MULTIMARKET
CONTACTS ON THE ABSOLUTE VALUE OF CHANGE IN MARKET SHARES











HER 0.02 * 0.02 * 0.02 * 0.02 *
(6.1) (6.3) (5.5) (5.7)
DLI 1.44 * 1.43 *
(28.9) (28.9)
LI 0.23 * 0.23 *
(13.1) (13.3)
DBRANCHES -0.008 * -0.008 * -0.009 * -0.009 *
(-5.7) (-5.1) (-6.0) (-5.5)
COSTS/ASSETS -0.21  * -0.17  * -0.20 * -0.16  *
(-3.2) (-2.7) (-3.1) (-2.5)




1.04 * 0.75 ** 0.91 * 0.61 ** 0.19 *
(5.1) (2.1) (4.4) (2.0) (3.9)
N. observations 6,935 6,935 6935 6935 6935
R
2 0.21 0.04 0.22 0.06 0.15
Lagrange Mult. Test 4669.2 3684 951 705 702
Hausman test 8.6 3.7 9.4 4.5 6.3
c
2   test:
Time, individual
Dummies
858 756 717 621 702
Dependent variable: annual absolute value percentage change in market shares.
Independent variables: Herfindahl index (HER); change in links between banks (DLi); links between
banks (LI); growth rate of loans (DLOAN); costs/assets ratio (COSTS/ASSETS); annual change in
branches (DBRANCHES); product between the  Herfindahl index and the number of contacts
(HECO).
Notes
t - statistics are in brackets.
*     Coefficient significant at 1 per cent.
**   Coefficient significant at 5 per cent.
The LM test is distributed as a c
2  with 2 degrees of freedom.
The Hausman test is distributed as a c
2 .Table 12
EFFECTS OF MULTIMARKET CONTACTS OUTSIDE THE PROVINCE ON
PROVINCIAL MARKET SHARES















CONSTANT 0.64 * 0.69 * 0.66 *
(2.6) (3.0) (3.0)
N. observations 6,935 6,935 6,935
R
2 0.007 0.007 0.007
Lagrange Mult. Test 4000 4005 3982
Hausman test 4.6 2.6 3.1
Dependent variable: annual absolute value percentage changes in banks’ market shares.
Independent variables:  Herfindahl index (HER); contacts between  multimarket banks in
municipalities (COItaly); contacts normalized by the number of multimarket banks in each
given province (COBP); annual changes of normalised contacts between banks (DCOBP).
Notes
t - statistics are in brackets.
*   Coefficient significant at 1 per cent.
** Coefficient significant at 5 per cent.
The LM test is distributed as a c
2  with 2 degrees of freedom.
The Hausman test is distributed as a c
2 .Table 13



















Dependent variable: loan interest rates.
Independent variables: links between banks (LI), growth rate of loans (DLOAN), banks’ bad loans to
total loans (BAD LOANS).
Notes
t - statistics are in brackets.
*     Coefficient significant at 1 per cent.
The Hausman test is distributed as a c
2  with 3 degrees of freedom.
The c
2  test for time dummies is distributed with 41 degrees of freedom.Fig. 1
BANKS’ BRANCHES AND NUMBER OF BANKS
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